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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRISON "NO-ASSISTANCE"
REGULATIONS AND THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER
The increasing popularity of the writ of habeas corpus, coupled
with the inability of many prison inmates to effectively draft
their own habeas petitions, has resulted in the emergence of a
group of knowledgeable inmate practitioners willing to assist
their fellow inmates in the preparation of habeas petitions and
other legal papers. To counter the administrative and disciplinary
problems posed by these "jailhouse lawyers," several state prison
systems have adopted regulations prohibiting all inter-inmate
assistance. Focusing upon the recent case of Johnson v. Avery,
wherein the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity
of the Tennessee no-assistance rule, this note examines the statu-
tory and constitutional problems presented by these prohibitory
regulations.
THE federal writ of habeas corpus is the traditional final check
upon the accuracy of the judicial process, giving to a person detained
the right to petition the courts for a hearing at which the legality of
any aspect of his detention may be questioned.1 The increasing pop-
ularity of the writ,2 coupled with the inability of large numbers of
prison inmates to draft an effective habeas corpus petition,3 has pro-
duced the "jailhouse lawyer"-the prisoner with some knowledge of
habeas corpus procedure, usually gained through his own experience,
' See generally 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 131
(C. Wright ed. 1960); 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 88.34 (2d ed. 1967); R. SOKOL,
A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS (1965); Leighton, Federal Supremacy and
Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 74 (1967); Note, 61 HARv. L. REV. 657
(1948). The statutory warrant for habeas corpus in the federal courts is provided by
sections 2241-55 of the Federal Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1964).
2 The number of habeas petitions-especially those emanating from state prison
inmates-filed with the federal courts has increased markedly in recent years. In
1941 the federal courts received 598 habeas corpus petitions, 127 of them from state
prisoners. By 1961 the total received reached 2,314 (including motions to vacate
sentence on behalf of federal prisoners), 984 from state prisoners. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 155 (1964).
In 1966 the petition figure totalled 5,853, of which 5,162 were received from inmates
in state prisons. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR 106 (1966).
8 Due to illiteracy or mental incapacity, large numbers of prison inmates are unable
to exercise their right to petition for review through habeas corpus. See notes 20-28
infra and accompanying text.
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who is willing to assist fellow inmates in drafting their petitions.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the right of
prison administrators to prohibit entirely the inmate practitioner
from preparing habeas corpus petitions on behalf of other prisoners.
In Johnson v. Avery,4 the court upheld a Tennessee State Prison
regulation which forbade any prisoner from assisting other inmates
with any legal matters, including the preparation of habeas corpus
petitions.5 Johnson, the petitioning inmate, had allegedly been
placed in solitary confinement for eleven months for attempting to
render legal assistance in violation of the above proscription. A
motion for release from this confinement, heard by the district court
as a petition for habeas corpus, was granted.0 In its reversal,7 the
circuit court noted that the federal habeas corpus statute does not
require that aid be given prisoners in the filing of their petitions.8
Further, in the court's view, the state's interest in regulating the
practice of law dictated that the prison prohibition be upheld, since
to allow inter-inmate assistance in legal matters would conflict with
the state unauthorized practice of law statute.0 Finally, the court
observed that the right to counsel has not been held an indispensable
element of post-conviction proceedings 0 and, further, that all recent
'382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1968)
(No. 902), rev'g 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
r The Guidance Manual for Prisoners, Sec. VI, page 7 provides that: "No inmate
will advise, assist or otherwise contract to aid another, either with or without a fee,
to prepare Writs or other legal matters. It is not intended that an innocent man be
punished. When a man believes he is unlawfully held or illegally convicted, he
should prepare a brief or state his complaint in letter form and address it to his lawyer
or a judge. A formal Writ is not necessary to receive a hearing. False charges or
untrue complaints may be punished. Inmates are forbidden to set themselves up as
practitioners for the purpose of promoting a business of writing Writs." 382 F.2d
at 354 n.1.
6Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), noted in 66 COLUm. L.
REv. 1542 (1966) and 19 STAN. L. REv. 887 (1967).
7382 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1967). The holding in Johnson, denying one inmate the
services of another in the preparation of legal papers, marks a possible conflict between
the decisions of the Sixth Circuit and those of the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. In
Arey v. Peyton, 378 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1967), an inmate alleged that a rule similar
to the one contested in Johnson unduly interfered with his access to the courts. The
Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further inquiry, holding
that prisoners unable to write or compose petitions may seek assistance from more
accomplished inmates. Id. at 931. A similar position was apparently espoused by the
Eighth Circuit in Burnside v. Nebraska, 378 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1967). See also White
v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
8 382 F.2d at 857.
Old. at 355-57.0 Id. at 356. The court called special attention to the fact that decisions do not
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Supreme Court decisions concerning the right to counsel contemplate
trained representation."' The opinion concluded that effective
access to legal assistance is a problem best left to the "bench, bar,
and law schools."' 12
Jailhouse lawyers often present significant problems for prison
administrators, courts, and other inmates.' 3 Administrators argue
require that courts furnish aid to prisoners drafting habeas corpus petitions. Cf.
Barker v. Ohio, 330 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1964). See also Rossmoore & Koenigsberg,
Habeas Corpus and the Indigent Prisoner, 11 RuTGERs L. REv. 611, 622-24 (1957);
19 STAN. L. Rav. 887, 888-90 (1967).
"
1See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), discussed in Elsen & Rosett,
Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 645
(1967) and The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HAav. L. REV. 91, 201-07 (1966) (right
to counsel during custodial interrogation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
noted in 44 ORE. L. REv. 163 (1964) and 19 RTrrGms L. REv. 111 (1964) (right to
counsel when emphasis shifts from investigatory to accusatory stage); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), discussed in 31 U. Cm.I L. REv. 591 (1964) and 25 U.
Prrr. L. Rav. 719 (1964) (right to counsel in non-capital criminal trials).
12382 F.2d at 357. The Sixth Circuit's dismissal of the problem of effective legal
assistance to inmates as one best left with "the bench, bar, and law schools" was
apparently made without regard to the extent such assistance is offered. That the
programs of these groups fall short of meeting serious inmate needs is borne out by
responses to a survey by the Duke Law Journal. For details of that survey see note
13 infra. While four of thirty-three answering states had state-funded programs em-
ploying attorneys or law students, see note 27 infra, only two states mentioned any
other form of legal assistance for prisoners. Connecticut has seven legal aid societies
willing to advise inmates on legal matters which are not fee generating, but no men-
tion was made as to the procedure through which an inmate would contact one of
them. Letter from Warden Fredrick G. Reincke, Connecticut State Prison, to the Duke
Law Journal, Dec. 1, 1967. North Dakota has a voluntary arrangement with the local
county bar association, whose members visit the prisoners on an alphabetical basis.
Letter from Charles F. Enders, North Dakota State Penitentiary, to the Duke
Law Journal, Nov. 17, 1967. While Mississippi reports that its prisons usually have
inmates who were formerly licensed attorneys, Letter from C.E. Breazeale, Super-
intendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary, to the Duke Law Journal, Oct. 16, 1967,
their expertise would be of no value to fellow prisoners if the prison adopted a no-
assistance rule as Tennessee had done in Johnson. Federal district courts will appoint
counsel whenever need for such assistance appears from the petition, Letter from
Robert Van Pelt, Judge, United States District Court for Nebraska, to the Duke Law
Journal, Nov. 7, 1967, but these courts are hesitant to request assistance from practicing
attorneys since no provision exists for payment of court-appointed counsel. Further,
the method employed in federal courts presupposes an effective inmate-prepared peti-
tion. Nebraska is also contemplating an arrangement by which senior law students
at the University of Nebraska would aid and advise prisoners, Letter from Robert
Van Pelt, supra, but at least one prison administrator finds utilization of law
students more burdensome than reliance on jailhouse lawyers, Letter from Ben L.
Garris, Associate Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, to the Duke Law Journal,
Nov. 13, 1967. Thus it would seem that the judiciary, bar associations, and law schools
are not at present providing the assistance to prisoners assumed by the Sixth Circuit's
decision.
1 See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 296-97 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Good-
man, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313, 315-16 (1947).
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that these practitioners encourage attitudes inimical to rehabilitation
by criticizing the administration and its policies, establishing an
inmate hierarchy,14 dominating the weaker and more naive inmates, 1
and focusing the attention of prisoners upon an often false hope of
release.16 Since the jailhouse lawyer has few other demands upon
his time, he produces a proliferous bulk of pleadings, petitions, writs,
and motions which add to the already serious problem of over-
crowded court dockets.27 In addition, the task of the judiciary in
The following conditions were described by one prison administrator: "At any
given time, the penitentiary has about 150 men who are very hostile to authority, bitter
about their sentences, sophisticated in criminality and court processes, and thus compose
a rather hard-core jailhouse lawyer group. About fifty of them are so deeply involved
in their legal activity that they have two or three cases going at the same time, chal-
lenging not only their own criminal cases but through the court processes challenging
the rules and regulations of the institution, constitutionality of [state] laws, qualifica-
tions of the sentencing judge and prosecuting attorney, etc." Letter from George
W. Randall, Administrator, Oregon State Board of Control, to the Duke Law Journal,
Oct. 19, 1967.
The above letter was one response to a survey undertaken by the Duke Law Journal
in connection with this note. Letters were sent to heads of penal institutions in all
state and federal jurisdictions, seeking information concerning the average educa-
tional achievement, intelligence, and literacy among inmates. Material relating to those
categories is included in the appendix, while responses discussing problems connected
with jailhouse lawyers or suggestions for providing legal assistance to inmates are
incorporated into the text or footnotes.
Thirty-three replies were received from fifty-one inquiries sent. All correspondence
is on file in the offices of the Duke Law Journal.
14 See Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 639 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862
(1961), noted in 58 Mic-r. L. Rav. 1233 (1960) and 39 TExAs L. Rv. 228 (1960).
2rLetter from Frank A. Eyman, Superintendent, Arizona State Prison, to the
Duke Law Journal, Nov. 7, 1967; Letter from George W. Randall, Administrator,
Oregon State Board of Control, to the Duke Law Journal, Oct. 19, 1967; Linde, Let's
Disbar the Jail House Lawyer, PROCEE INS OF THE Am. CORRETrIONAL AsS'N 124, 127
(1962). There is general agreement among prisoners and administrators that a rule
against the payment of fees for work done by the jailhouse lawyer is difficult to en-
force. Such work is often done for barter items, such as cigarettes. Letter from James
H. Noe, Virginia State Penitentiary #81178, to the Duke Law Journal, Nov. 1, 1967;
Letter from Frank A. Eyman, supra; Letter from George W. Randall, supra.
18 An example of the false hopes generated by jailhouse lawyers is the case of
Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965). The defendant refused to allow his
court-appointed attorney to appeal his conviction to a higher state court. He felt he
could more easily secure release from the Hunstville State Prison because "they've got
some boys down there that are authorities on writs of habeas corpus." Id. at 702.
17 The District of Columbia Circuit once angrily noted that, during a 5-year period,
119 inmates managed to present 597 petitions to that court. One inmate alone pro-
duced 50 separate petitions for habeas corpus. See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862-
63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945). Prison administrators responding to
the Journal survey complained of the large amount of legal papers and petitions pro-
duced by small numbers of inmates. One reported example concerned a prisoner con-
ducting post conviction and habeas corpus proceedings in his own criminal case, chal-
lenging divorce proceedings brought by his wife, contesting a child adoption suit,
and pressing four different suits against the warden and various penitentiary regula-
[Vol. 1968: 343
JAILHOUSE LAWYERS
discerning meritorious claims is often made more difficult by the
legal myths and misconceptions propagated in the jailhouse lawyer's
work.' 8 Since that work may often be of poor legal quality, it is
the illiterate inmate being assisted who may ultimately suffer if his
meritorious claim is not heard or understood. 9
Despite the problems created by jailhouse practitioners, they may
fulfill-although inadequately-significant needs within their prison
society. The conclusion is inescapable that prisoners generally are
far less prepared than the average citizen for the task of drafting the
type of petition necessary to gain judicial attention. The average
citizen has the equivalent of a high school education,20 while in most
tions. These actions were proceeding simultaneously in seven different courts. Fur-
thermore, in addition to his own work, the inmate was employing three attorneys
on his various projects. Letter from George W. Randall, Administrator, Oregon State
Board of Control, to the Duke Law Journal, Oct. 19, 1967. An inmate contacted by
the Journal, though confessedly in the minority, felt that some means of control should
be exercised to keep prisoners' groundless petitions from cluttering the courts. He
based his opinion upon observations that some inmates do in fact produce knowingly
frivolous petitions which advance grounds that cannot possibly be supported at a
hearing. Letter from James H. Noe, Virginia State Penitentiary #81178, to the Duke
Law Journal, Nov. 1, 1967.
18 "Not less important . . . is the problem presented by the character of the peti-
tions themselves. Much of the judges' time is spent in trying to decipher and interpret
the chaotic papers that come to them from prison inmates. Many of the petitioners
are illiterates, or persons of limited education who depend upon 'jail-house lawyers'
for assistance in preparing these documents. Not only are such practitioners notori-
ously unreliable, but their work product is often a mass of confused and incompre-
hensible legal mumbo-jumbo. Judges have no way of knowing from a reading
of the papers whether the prisoner has merely copied language from other cases,
wholly dissimilar from his case, or has something worthwhile to allege, but is inept
due to his lack of legal training." Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review, Report
of the Committee on Habeas Corpus, 33 F.R.D. 363, 384-85 (1963).
Prisoners often hear of new cases through newspapers or rumor within the prison,
and many seem to think that cases from other jurisdictions, though factually dis-
tinguishable, will serve as a basis for their release. One such rumor claimed that
constitutional provisions against double jeopardy were violated by a trial for an
escape after accumulated good time had been taken away or the escapee had been
placed in solitary confinement. Inmates in Wisconsin fully expected that the case of
In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958), which held that Michigan in-
mates confined without trial under that state's sexual psychopath law could not be
confined as criminals, would apply to secure their release. Note, Legal Services for
Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. Rv. 514, 516-17.
10 See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 232, 135 S.E.2d 823 (1964), in which the
court granted a petition, apparently drafted by another prisoner, despite "untrue and
irresponsible" allegations. Reliance upon fellow prisoners may occasionally cause a
prisoner to fail to pursue other reliable channels for relief, see note 16 supra, although
professionally trained assistance is not always readily available, see note 12 supra.
See also Linde, supra note 15, at 124-25.
20 U.S. DEP'T or COMMERCE, BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 113 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 STATisTIcAL ABSTRACT].
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states the average prisoner has spent only eight years in school.21
Although two percent of the national population is classified as
illiterate,22 many prison systems report a substantially higher per-
centage of illiteracy.23 Approximately one half of one percent of the
population at large is mentally defective; 24 yet representative state
samplings show that almost three times as many prisoners suffer from
mental deficiencies. 25  Hence, a large segment of the prison popula-
tion is unable to write even the short, simple factual statement
required to initiate review through habeas corpus. 20 Also, because
21 See appendix. The state reporting the highest average educational level in the
survey was Washington, whose inmates have a median education level of 9.8 years.
Letter from Washington State Department of Institutions, to the Duke Law Journal,
Nov. 19, 1967. The lowest education achievement reported was in Alabama, with 4.5
years average schooling per inmate. Letter from A. Frank Lee, Commissioner, Ala-
bama Board of Corrections, to the Duke Law Journal, Oct. 9, 1967. It is interesting
to note that tests universally indicated a lower level of achievement than that claimed
in statistics showing the number of years of school attended. When both figures are
given, discrepancies approaching four years are possible. For example, North Carolina
reported median school attendance of 8.33 years, while achievement testing indicated a
median of 4.57 years. Letter from Frank A. Hall, Administrative Assistant, North
Carolina Department of Correction, to the Duke Law Journal, Nov. 28, 1967.
22 1966 STATISTICAL A.sTRACr 116.
2 2Louisiana: 16% of all inmates are illiterate. Letter from Ben L. Garris, Associate
Warden, to the Duke Law Journal, Nov. 13, 1967. Oregon: 14% are illiterate at ad-
mission. Letter from George W. Randall, Administrator, Oregon State Board of
Control, to the Duke Law Journal, Oct. 19, 1967. Texas: 16% of the prisoners are
illiterate. Letter from Dr. George Beto, Director, State Department of Corrections, to
the Duke Law Journal, Nov. 17, 1967. For a complete list of the illiteracy in all
state prisons responding to the survey see appendix. States reported illiteracy among
inmates within a wide range. Delaware reported 40% illiteracy among prisoners,
Letter from Dr. William Nardini, Commissioner, Delware Deparmtent of Corrections,
to the Duke Law Journal, Nov. 14, 1967, while Minnesota reported only 1% of all
inmates illiterate, Letter from James N. Bradford, Special Assistant Attorney General,
Minnesota Department of Corrections, to the Duke Law Journal, Nov. 13, 1967, which
is only one-half of the national illiteracy rate. See note 22 supra and accompanying
text. Figures showing an illiteracy rate among prisoners lower than the national
average are naturally suspect unless accompanied by some explanation, as in the case of
Oregon. See appendix. Some literacy figures are doubtless based on definitions that
are not meaningful for the purpose of this note, since the ability to draft a habeas corpus
petition may require more than mere functional literacy.
24 See 1966 STATiSTIC.AL ABsTRAcr 77.
25Florida officials reported that 1.2% of that state's prison inmates were mentally
disabled. Letter from Jack D. Straubing, Administrative Assistant, Florida Division of
Corrections, to the Duke Law Journal, Oct. 13, 1967. Minnesota: 4%, Letter from
James N. Bradford, Special Assistant Attorney General, Minnesota Department of
Corrections, to the Duke Law Journal, Nov. 13, 1967. Oregon: 1%, Letter from George
W. Randall, Administrator, Oregon State Board of Control, to the Duke Law Journal,
Oct. 19, 1967. Wisconsin: 1.2%, Letter from John G. Stoddard, Wisconsin Institutional
Services, to the Duke Law Journal, Oct. 20, 1967. For a comparison of mental disability
in all reporting states see appendix.
2 0 See 2,52 F. Supp. at 787.
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of his confinement, the illiterate prisoner usually is unable personally
to contact an attorney; and few lawyers voluntarily visit the prison
to provide inmates the needed assistance. Furthermore, most prisons
do not provide any type of free legal services on a regular basis.2 7
Consequently, in many jurisdictions the inmate lawyer provides the
only means of assistance for the illiterate or semi-literate prisoner
who wishes to petition for habeas corpus.28
The lower court in Johnson, acutely aware of the illiteracy
problem,29 held the prison regulation in question invalid as con-
flicting with a right to assistance in the preparation of habeas corpus
petitions granted by section 2242 of the Judiciary Act.80 The pre-
27 Of thirty-three responses to the survey conducted in connection with this note,
only five states reported free legal services of any type. Oregon, Minnesota, and New
Jersey have employed a staff of trained attorneys who represent the prisoners as public
defenders. Letters to the Duke Law Journal from George W. Randall, Administrator,
Oregon State Board of Control, Oct. 19, 1967; James N. Bradford, Special Assistant
Attorney General, Minnesota Department of Corrections, Nov. 13, 1967; and Lloyd W.
McCorkle, Commissioner, New Jersey State Department of Institutions and Agencies,
Nov. 22, 1967. The Oregon program is discussed in notes 80-81 infra and accompany-
ing text. Texas employs two senior law students each summer to advise inmates,
Letter from Dr. George Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, to the Duke
Law journal, Nov. 17, 1967, while North Dakota has a voluntary arrangement with
the county bar association to provide free legal advice to inmates by sending the
attorneys to the prison on an alphabetical basis. Letter from Charles F. Enders, North
Dakota State Penitentiary, to the Duke Law journal, Nov. 17, 1967.
28 The court of appeals seemingly failed to grasp the magnitude and immediacy of
this problem. The court stated: "The main thrust of the District Court's opinion on
this issue was that the petitioner's services are needed to make other prisoners' rights
to habeas corpus effective in light of their own limited abilities. We believe that on
closer analysis this right to effective post-conviction procedures does not warrant so
drastic a limitation on the power of the state to regulate discipline in its penal institu-
tions and to control the practice of law within its borders." 382 F.2d at 356. However,
review of relevant statistics tends to reinforce the original conclusions of the district
court. See appendix.
.- The language of the district court clearly showed an understanding of the prob-
lems faced by many inmates, as seen in the following- "From the Court's experience
with habeas corpus petitions, it is apparent that without the assistance of some third
party, many prisoners in the state penitentiary would be totally incapable of preparing
an intelligible petition, letter or request on their own behalf. The respondent does
not deny this, but asserts that the solution is for such a prisoner to contact a licensed
attorney to act in his behalf. Of course, the same incapacities (sub-standard intelli-
gence, inability to write, etc.) which make it impossible for a prisoner to draft a mean-
ingful habeas corpus petition also make it impossible for him to draft a letter which
would be sufficient to arouse the attorney's interest. Furthermore, few indeed would
be the lawyers who would volunteer to represent such prisoners, the great majority of
whom are totally indigent.
For all practical purposes, if such prisoners cannot have the assistance of a
'jail-house lawyer,' their possible valid constitutional claims will never be heard in any
court." 252 F. Supp. at 784.
s0 "Clearly, by the instant regulation, the prison officials have interfered with the
statutory right of prisoners, incapable of acting for themselves, to have someone act on
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decessor of section 2242 required that the petition be "in writing
signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended."3 1
However, under the old statute some courts allowed an individual
to petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a second party
whenever it could be adequately shown that the petition was autho-
rized by the second party and that party was, due to some physical or
mental handicap, incapable of personally filing the petition.32 The
legislative history of the 1948 amendment to section 2242 indicates
that the revisors, by adding the words "or by someone acting in his
behalf" to the old statute, intended to incorporate this liberal second-
party practice. 33 Citing the 1948 revision of the statute, the district
their behalf just as surely and effectively as if the officials had made it an offense for
such prisoners to request such assistance. No matter how it is analyzed, the effect
of the prison regulation now in question is to deprive these prisoners of their federal
statutory right to have a habeas corpus petition filed on their behalf by a third
party." 252 F. Supp. at 785 (emphasis in original).
Section 2242 reads as follows:
"Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by
the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.
"It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant's commitment or detention, tile
name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority,
if known.
"It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure ap-
plicable to civil actions.
"If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state
the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which
the applicant is held." 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1964) (emphasis added).
31 Federal Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 13, § 754, 18 Stat. 142 (1878).
32 See Collins v. Traeger, 27 F.2d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1928); United States ex rel.
Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1921); Ex parle Dostal, 243 F. 664, 668
(N.D. Ohio 1917); United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, 164 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1908). In Houston the court broadly asserted in dicta that, due to English common
law precedents, second party writs are permissible in many cases where it is neither
possible nor feasible for the detained party himself to execute the writ. 273 F. at
916, citing In re Ferrens, 8 F. Cas. 1158 (No. 4746) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869). The Funaro
case allowed a petition to be presented by the attorney of a party facing deportation.
The court mentioned in dicta other situations compelling the acceptance of second
party petitions, notably the infancy or incompetency of the party detained, or a lack
of time in which to act. It should be noted that the above cases required that the
petition explain why the person in custody did not himself present the petition.
See Gusman v. Marrero, 180 U.S. 81, 87 (1901). See also Wilson v. Dixon, 256 F.2d
536 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958), in which the court refused to hear a
petition drafted for one inmate by another prisoner. The court emphasized that the
inmate in whose behalf the petition was submitted was already represented in other
proceedings by competent counsel. Id. at 537-38.
"s The entire relevant legislative history of the 1948 revision of § 2242 is contained
in the following few lines: "Words 'or by some one acting in his behalf' were added.
This follows the actual practice of the courts, as set forth in United States ex rel.
Funaro v. Watchorn, C. C. 1908, 164 F. 152; Collins v. Traeger, C.C.A. 1928, 27 F.2d
842, and cases cited." H.R. REP'. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess, A178 (1947). See note
32 supra,
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court held that the Tennessee prison regulation conflicted with the
federal statutory right to assistance granted by the amended section
2242.31 The district court holding, in effect, legitimatized the
limited practice of jailhouse lawyers where states have failed to
provide any alternative means of assistance.3 5 Reversing, the Sixth
Circuit contended that the amended language of section 2242 re-
ferred only to the act of signing and verifying the petition, and not
to its drafting or preparation.36 According to the circuit court, the
"incapacity" contemplated by the statute meant physical or mental
handicaps which prevented the inmate from authenticating, rather
than initially preparing, the petition.3 7
While the Sixth Circuit denied that section 2242 grants an in-
mate a right to assistance in the preparation of habeas petitions, the
court conceded that the section does authorize a second party to sign
or verify the petition. The court apparently interpreted section
2242 as conferring standing upon a representative acting in behalf
of the prisoner.38 If the petition adequately explains the necessity
for second-party authentication, 39 a second party may prepare and
verify the petition. In sum, while section 2242 does not grant an
affirmative right of assistance, it does decree that assistance, once ob-
tained, shall be entitled to recognition.40  The benefit conferred
upon the inmate by the "standing" rationale is, of course, operative
only insofar as the inmate has access to parties willing to draft and
authenticate petitions. If the statute presents no barrier to the
promulgation of a regulation prohibiting inter-inmate assistance,
3' 252 F. Supp. at 785.
35 "[A] regulation prohibiting the practice [of jailhouse lawyers] altogether might
well be sustained if the state afforded to prison inmates any reasonable alternative,
such as an available list of qualified lawyers willing to volunteer their services .... "
Id. at 785. Experience indicates that the practice of jailhouse lawyers naturally de-
clines where inmates have ready access to competent legal counsel that will advise
them in legal matters. See notes 80-81 infra and accompanying text, describing the
program employed in Oregon.
30 382 F.2d at 357.
37 "[T]he inability or incompetency to which this section is addressed is not the in-
ability to draft legal papers as the District Court seems to hold. . . . It seems clear
that the situation to which this provision was meant to apply, is one where physical
or mental handicaps prevent the prisoner from personally signing or verifying the
petition, not one wherein lack of intelligence or legal training keep him from drafting
his own papers." Id.
18 See id.; 66 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1542, 1545 (1966); 19 STAN. L. Rxv. 887, 888 (1967).
30 See note 32 supra.
40 66 CoLu r. L, REv. 1542, 1545 (1966).
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the present benefit conferred becomes illusory since the state may
easily negate the operative effect of section 2242.41 The restrictive
interpretation acceptable to the Johnson court is inconsistent with
the demonstrable need for second-party assistance,42 and is not com-
pelled by the cases or legislative history underlying the section.48
In addition to rejecting the lower court's interpretation of the
habeas corpus statute, the circuit court felt the prison regulation
should be upheld as a valid compliment to Tennessee's unauthorized
practice of law statute. The court took a literal view of the statutory
indication that the drawing of legal papers is included within the
practice of law. 44 Since Johnson had not been admitted to the
state bar, he could not lawfully prepare habeas corpus petitions. The
court indicated that it could not allow activities within the prison
which would constitute crimes if carried on in society at large. 45
Finally, the court noted that decisions concerning the right to counsel
have always stressed representation by qualified, trained individuals,
and that no real benefit would inure to prison inmates by allowing
other untrained convicts to assist them.46
The circuit court's characterization of the problem in Johnson as
one of representation in legal matters is somewhat inaccurate. The
assistance ordinarily provided by the inmate lawyer is perhaps more
reasonably classified as clerical, for he merely writes a letter to the
court setting out the circumstances of the conviction and requesting
judicial relief.4 7 In a significant early decision interpreting Tennes-
"1 Illiterate or mentally handicapped inmates are unlikely to have access to assistance
emanating from outside the prison. See 19 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890 (1967); notes 26-28
supra and accompanying text.
42 See notes 20-28 supra and accompanying text.
Il None of the cases cited by the revisers considered a prohibitory regulation similar
to the one in Johnson. See note 33 supra. The language of the statute would seem
to confirm the interpretation given by the district court. 19 STAN. L. Rav. 887, 888(1967).
A,"The 'practice of law' is defined to be and is the appearance as an advocate in
a representative capacity or the drawing of papers, pleadings or documents ... in
connection with proceedings pending before any court, commissioner, referee or any
body, board, committee or commission constituted by law or having authority to settle
controversies. The 'law business' is defined to be and is the advising or counseling for
a valuable consideration of any person, firm, association, or corporation ...... TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-302 (1955).
" 382 F.2d at 356.
16 Id. at 357.
47 Habeas corpus petitions should contain allegations of fact and not legal argu-
ments. See Johnson v. Rhay, 266 F.2d 530, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1959); Johnson v. Avery,
252 F. Supp. 783, 787 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), ree'd on other grounds, 382 F.2d 353 (6th
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see's broad statutory delineation of the practice of law,4r, that state's
supreme court held that a furniture store clerk who filled in the blank
spaces on a prinited form for a writ of replevin was not engaged in
prohibited conduct, since the acts were clerical in nature and
required none of the intellectual, moral, or professional qualifica-
tions of an attorney.49 Emphasizing that the acts could have been
performed by any literate layman, the Tennessee court further held
that, in order to come within the statutory prohibition, the conduct
in question must have been performed for valuable consideration
and must have included an appearance in court in a representative
capacity. 0 Johnson's activities in the present case, therefore, may
not have constituted the practice of law in Tennessee, since he was
preparing petitions which could have been drafted by any literate
layman, no compensation was involved, and no appearance or ad-
vocacy was contemplated.51
Regardless of the resolution of the statutory argument, the prison
regulation in question appears constitutionally infirm. The right to
file for habeas corpus is accorded a favored position by the Constitu-
tion and common law precedents.52  The right is guaranteed by
Cir. 1967); cf. Adamson v. Nash, 218 F. Supp. 841, 845 (W.D. Mo. 1963). Courts,
however, liberally interpret habeas petitions. See, e.g., Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S.
342, 350 (1941); Murray v. Louisiana, 347 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1965); Geaminea v.
Nebraska, 206 F. Supp. 808, 315-16 (D. Neb.), appeal dismissed, 308 F.2d 367 (8th
Cir. 1962). But cf. Dickerson v. Director, 235 Md. 668, 202 A.2d 765 (1964), in which
the court dismissed the petition of a mentally defective inmate for lack of specificity.
"8 See note 44 supra.
," See Haverty Furniture Co. v. Foust, 174 Tenn. 203, 208, 124 S.W.2d 694, 698
(1939).
60 Id. at 209-14, 124 S.W.2d at 696-98.
r Unauthorized practice statutes are traditionally aimed at preventing clients from
entrusting their problems to ill-trained advisers. While prisoners deserve protection
from bad advice, the traditional reasoning is not strictly applicable to jailhouse lawyers.
The drafting of a habeas corpus petition requires minimal legal skill. Also, prisoners
may file as many petitions as they desire. Thus, the effect of "bad advice" at some
point may be overcome by a later petition. See 19 STAN. L. REv. 887, 891 (1967).
Furthermore, it should be recognized that, in the context of the Johnson case, the
unauthorized practice argument is essentially a makeweight. If the prison regulation
conflicts with a right granted by federal statute, as the district court believed, the
unauthorized practice argument must be subordinated. See Sperry v. Florida ex
tel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). The state interests represented by the un-
authorized practice statute have also been subordinated to constitutional provisions.
See, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). In sum,
the unauthorized practice statute is often not a strong defensive weapon. The state
interest in preserving discipline within its prisons is a much more credible rationale for
the type of regulation tested in Johnson. See notes 13-19 supra and accompanying
text.
z2 Habeas corpus is accorded specific mention in article 1, section 9 of the United
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federal statute63 and included in the substantive law of at least forty-
seven state jurisdictions.54 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
"that the writ of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal
liberty and there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired." 5
Therefore, any regulation which tends to inhibit the availability
or effectiveness of this remedy should be closely scrutinized.
Vindication of the right to petition for the writ necessarily re-
quires access to the courts, a privilege secured against state in-
trusion by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.50
While prison administrators, exercising the broad discretion allowed
them in maintaining order and discipline, may curtail prisoner
activities which, for persons outside a prison, would be constitu-
tionally protected, no administrative interest will sustain significant
interference with the prisoners' access to the courts.51 Thus, where
States Constitution, which provides that the privilege of the writ shall not be sus-
pended except when the public safety may require. English subjects were guaranteed
the right to personal liberty by the Magna Charta, c. 29, and other acts, notably the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2.
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1964).
5" See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961), discussed in Rossman, Review
of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 47 A.B.A.J. 725, 728 (1961).
See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
"Egx parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Kirby v. Thomas, 336 F.2d 462 (6th Cir.
1964); Bolden v. Pegelow, 329 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1964). See also Comment, The Rights
of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BuFFALo L. Rav. 397, 414 (1965); Note, Constitu-
tional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. Rlv. 985, 987-92
(1962).
5 Compare Kirby v. Thomas, 336 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1964) (upholding regulation
forbidding prisoner from mailing papers to initiate civil suit); In re Ferguson, 55
Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961) (Black
Muslim prisoners not allowed to hold prayer meetings); and In re Johnson v. Com-
missioner, 6 App. Div. 2d 920, 175 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1958) (inmate allowed to receive
only those letters from his children which were in their handwriting, as opposed to
those penned by their mother), with Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (prison
authorities may not fail to forward petitions to the proper court even though they
believe the grounds asserted to be insufficient or untrue); Hymes v. Dickson, 232 F.
Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1964) (inmates should not have to answer to prison authorities
for allegations in complaints addressed to courts); and People v. Superior Court, 273
P.2d 936 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (prison authorities must forward petitions to the
court no matter how false the allegations). See also Dewitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th
Cir. 1966); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); Haines v. Castle, 226
F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1014 (1956).
Defining the nature and extent of the civil and constitutional rights retained by
prisoners is difficult, since pronouncements from courts most often look in a negative
direction; that is, the court is usually more anxious to delineate the rights that are
taken from the inmate than to elucidate those he retains. A typical and oft-quoted
phrase is that of the Supreme Court in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948):
"Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal
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a state prison promulgated a rule requiring that all habeas corpus
petitions be approved by the legal investigator for the parole board
before being forwarded to the proper court, the rule was held invalid
by the Supreme Court.58 While conceding the merit of the interests
advanced by the prison officials in support of the rule,59 the Court
firmly asserted that "the state and its officers may not abridge or
impair [the] right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus."'' 0
Mental or physical incapacity would not seem to justify deroga-
tion of the absoluteness of this right. Yet, while the illiterate or
handicapped prisoner may be guaranteed access to the courts, access
alone is of little value to him if he lacks the capacity or means
effectively to assert his objections. Thus, for those prisoners whose
mental or educational level precludes written communications in
system." This hesitance to delineate the affirmative rights retained by the prisoner is
further compounded by the traditional reluctance of courts to interfere with prison
administration. This reluctance is best understood as a rebuttable presumption of
correctness in favor of the rules, regulations, and methods of prison administrators.
See McCloskey v. State, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961), noted in 58 MicH. L. Rv. 1233 (1960) and 39
TXAs L. Rv. 228 (1960). The rule is probably based on several grounds, including
the principle of the separation of powers and a lack of judicial expertise in the many
and complicated problems involved in confining large numbers of persons with varying
degrees of anti-social behavior patterns. Cf. Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d'487 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964); Seigel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950). It appears that courts will refrain from interference
even in the face of substantial doubt as to the necessity for the practices in question.
See Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 139 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920
(1967). Recent thinking, however, has indicated both the necessity and desirability
of making a positive, affirmative declaration of the constitutional rights of prisoners.
See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review
the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YAIE LJ. 506 (1963). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit
has not always been so reluctant to look into prison regulations as in the Johnson case.
See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), where the court stressed that
it would be diligent in finding ways to protect the retained rights of prisoners.
r8 Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
10 While the court in Hull did not enumerate the grounds advanced by the prison
officials in support of the rule requiring administrative screening of inmate petitions,
those grounds were probably analogous to those in notes 13, 17, & 18 supra and accom-
panying text. Courts allow prison administrators wide discretion in promulgating regu-
lations that intimately affect personal prisoner activities, presumably in deference to
administrative expertise in maintaining discipline and order within the prison. Despite
this judicial tolerance in most areas, no grounds have yet been found that will support
an apparently reasonable rule requiring prisoners to submit their legal papers to
prison officials for screening, thus affirming the absolute nature of the right of access
to the courts. See note 57 supra.
00 312 U.S. at 549.
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their own behalf, the right of access must clearly embrace the corol-
lary right to seek and obtain assistance in the preparation of the requi-
site petitions. In a different context, the Supreme Court quite early
held that the right to a fair trial, as preserved in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, demanded that in many cases
an illiterate or handicapped suspect be provided the services of
an attorney.61 The Court reasoned that the constitutional right
to a fair trial would be meaningless absent some effort to counter
the handicaps of the defendant.62 Similarly, some degree of out-
side assistance is necessary to give meaning to the illiterate's right
of reasonable access to the courts.63 The court in Johnson was not,
however, presented with the question of whether the state is com-
pelled to provide affirmative assistance to illiterate prisoners. Rather,
the problem in Johnson was the lesser one of the extent to which
the state may foreclose the primary means of private assistance while
refusing to provide alternatives.
Prison regulations which have made access to judicial review
more difficult have often been sustained. It seems clear, for in-
stance, that the prison may limit the times during which prisoners
may work on legal materials, 64 limit the amount of funds which
prisoners may use for the purchase of legal documents,05 and, in
some cases, even deny the prisoners access to legal materials.00 On
the other hand, regulations and practices which have effectively fore-
closed access to judicial review have been consistently invalidated. 7
The effect of the prison regulation in Johnson goes substantially
beyond a mere limitation upon access. By depriving illiterate pris-
oners of their sole realistic avenue of aid, the regulation parallels in
operative effect a decree flatly prohibiting the filing of petititons
and is certainly more prohibitory in nature than the practice of
administrative screening of petitions condemned in Hull. 8
"1 See Betts v. Brady, 816 U.S. 455 (1942), discussed in Kamisar, Betts v. Brady
Twenty Years Later. The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 Mictr. L. RE.
219 (1962); cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
" See 316 U.S. at 472-73; cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932).
O"See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
O"Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 862 (1961).
Or See id. at 638-89.
"8 E.g., Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957); Grove v.
Smyth, 169 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1958).
'7See note 57 supra.
68Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). Relying upon the requirements of due
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The Tennessee regulation also seems vulnerable to attack as a
denial of equal protection of the laws. Traditionally, equal pro-
tection has been invoked where some identifiable group has been
discriminated against, without rational justification, in such a way
as to foreclose to the group some right or privilege available to
others.69 The Tennessee regulation does not evince, on its face, a
clearly discriminatory purpose or an arbitrary classification of groups.
However, Griffin v. Illinois7o and its progeny established a strong
basis for constitutional attack against the type of regulation involved
in Johnson. In Griffin the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois
requirement that a convict purchase a transcript of his trial in order
to secure full state court appellate review. The Court reasoned that,
since the ability to pay the cost of transcripts bears no rational rela-
tionship to guilt or innocence, the state could no more discriminate
on the basis of poverty than religion, race, or color.71 The Griffin
rule was later applied in Burns v. Ohio72 to void a requirement that
criminal defendants pay a filing fee in order to docket motions for
leave to appeal. The Court drew attention to the fact that there
was no basis for assuming that the motions of indigents would be any
less meritorious than those brought by other defendants.1 3 The rules
announced in Griffin and Burns were extended to state habeas
corpus proceedings in Smith v. Bennett74 wherein the Court voided
an Iowa statute requiring a four-dollar filing fee for habeas corpus
petitions. The Court felt that to interpose any financial considera-
process, the court in White v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ga. 1967), recently
stated that a no-assistance rule, if literally interpreted, would not be legal.
6 See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), noted in The Supreme
Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. Riv. 62, 127-31 (1963) (state action enforcing segre-
gation on basis of race held denial of equal protection); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963), discussed in Comment, Right to Counsel in Criminal Post-Conviction Re-
view Proceedings, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 970 (1963) and The Supreme Court, 1962 Term,
supra at 105-08 (state failure to provide counsel for indigents on mandatory review
held denial of equal protection); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), discussed in
Note, 80 GEo. WAstr. L. REv. 1010 (1962) (state failure to reapportion legislature
held denial of equal protection).
10 351 U.S. 12 (1956), discussed in Kamisar, supra note 61, at 244-54 and Willcox
& Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL
L.Q. 1 (1957).
3 851 U.S. at 17.
7360 U.S. 252 (1959), noted in Rossman, Review of Recent Supreme Court De-
cisions, 45 A.B.A.J. 1072 (1959).
Is 360 U.S. at 257-58.
7' 365 U.S. 708 (1961), discussed in Rossman, Review of Recent Supreme Court
Decisions, 47 A.B.AJ. 725, 728 (1961).
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tions between an indigent prisoner and his exercise of a state right
would deny the prisoner equal protection of the law." Thus, in each
of the above cases, the Court voided state action that discriminated
against indigents in such a way as to make inaccessable rights of
review and habeas corpus.76
Clearly, the practical effect of the prison regulation in Johnson
is to deny access to judicial review to another identifiable group-in
this case, illiterates rather than indigents. Under the regulation, the
inability of the illiterate to petition for habeas corpus is as com-
plete as if the regulation denied him the right of petition on its
face.77 Furthermore, the detrimental impact of Tennessee's no-
assistance rule is even more severe than the state procedure in
Griffin, since a degree of review was still available to indigents
there, albeit on less favorable terms, 78 or in Smith, where federal
courts were still available for habeas corpus proceedings without
payment of the four-dollar fee.79 Under the circumstances authorized
in Johnson, the Tennessee no-assistance rule closes the door to any
and all review by habeas corpus for inmates who are unable to draft
their own petitions.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis does not mean that Tennessee could not regu-
late, or even entirely prohibit, practice by jailhouse lawyers. Because
of the difficulties created by the presence of these advisers, the
state may have a strong interest in adopting a regulatory scheme.
However, the plan must not operate to prevent large numbers of
prisoners from achieving judicial consideration of their grievances.
The experience of other states illustrates that the problems posed
by jailhouse lawyers can be met with measures less drastic and
offensive than the regulation promulgated by Tennessee.
An acceptable solution to the dual problems of effective access
to legal assistance and the practice of jailhouse lawyers lies in the
extension of the right to counsel to post-conviction remedies through
the development of a state public defender office employing a staff
7 265 U.S. at 709.
10 See Kamisar, supra note 61, at 248-54.
" Cf. The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 H.uAv. L. Rlv. 83, 127 (1956). Prison
regulations directly prohibiting the filing of prisoner appeals have been held violative
of equal protection. See Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951);
Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942).
'351 U.S. at 13 n.2.
3 65 U.S. at 713.
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of attorneys to represent inmates in appeal and review proceedings.
After instituting such a program, Oregon, for example, reported that
the ordinary inmate no longer attempted to draft his own legal
papers, or sought assistance from other inmates, since full and com-
petent service was made available without charge by the public
defenders office.80  Furthermore, the program has reduced the possi-
bility of frivolous appeals since most inmates accept the opinion of
the defender as to the strength of their cases and do not attempt to
prosecute appeals on their own. 1
For the state presently unable to afford such a program, an in-
teresting system has been employed in Nebraska with impetus from
the federal courts. That state originally had a no-assistance rule
similar to the Tennessee regulation.8 2  However, in the course of a
habeas corpus proceeding brought by an inmate to secure release
from solitary confinement for allegedly violating the rule, the warden
was ordered by the court to amend the provision so as to allow
assistance.8 3 The prison then established one capable inmate as the
writ writer, and furnished him with basic law books and other
necessary materials. Inmates are now allowed to consult with the
writ writer at scheduled times in the prison library, subject to the
warden's permission. 4 The local federal district court also provides
a simple mimeographed habeas corpus form to be used in connection
with the above program. The form requests the inmate to supply
information on his conviction, appeal, prior habeas corpus petitions,
and attorneys, in order to assist the court in determining the relevant
facts of his case and his grounds for review.8 5
so Letter from George W. Randall, Administrator, Oregon State Board of Control,
to the Duke Law Journal, Oct. 19, 1967.
81 d.
82 See Burnside v. Nebraska, 378 F.2d 915, 916 (8th Cir. 1967).8 d.°
Letter from Ronald B. Jones, Associate Warden, Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex, to the Duke Law Journal, Oct. 17, 1967.
1r Judge Robert Van Pelt of the United States District Court in Lincoln, Nebraska,
provides inmates with a mimeographed form for filing habeas corpus petitions. He
reports that the use of this form, combined with an appointed inmate to assist other
inmates in its preparation, has greatly facilitated the problem of determining which
claims are likely to prove meritorious, and, hence, deserving of the appointment of
counsel. Letter from Robert Van Pelt, Judge, United States District Court for
Nebraska, to the Duke Law Journal, Nov. 7, 1967.
The practice of providing prisoners with forms for habeas corpus petitions ap-
parently began with the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
and has been followed by a number of other districts. See R. SoKoL, A HANDBOOK or
FEtD EL HA _As CoRpus 53-54, 192-200 (1965).
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APPENDIX
The following information was received in response to a survey
undertaken by the Duke Law Journal. Letters were sent to all state
and federal prison administrators with a request for information con-
cerning educational achievement, intelligence, and literacy among
inmates. Material relating to these items is included in this ap-
pendix. Differences in the bases employed and forms of expression,
however, preclude a meaningful tabular comparision of jurisdic-
tions.
Discussion of the problems and solutions connected with jailhouse
lawyers was encouraged, and responses are incorporated into the
body of this note. Of fifty-one inquiries sent, thirty-three replies were
received. All correspondence is on file in the offices of the Duke Law
Journal.
SELEcrED CHARAcrEIusTcs
OF PRISON INMATES BY JURISDICTION
Federal Bureau of Prisons: 51.7% claim to have completed more than
8 years schooling; 24.6% test higher than 8th grade; 19% below 90 I.Q.;
4% are either illiterate or have completed less than one year in school.
Alabama: Average of 4/ years school completed; 80 average I.Q.;
10% illiteracy.
Arizona: 45% have not completed 8th grade; 3.3% are illiterate.
California: Average 8 years schooling; I.Q. is average.
Colorado: Average 8 years schooling; average I.Q. is 95.3; 6.2%
were confined in mental hospitals prior to prison admission.
Connecticut: Average 6.4 years schooling; average I.Q. is 93.6.
Delaware: Average 7 years schooling; I.Q. is average; 40% are illit-
erate.
Florida: 48% completed less than 9 years education; 25% are below
80 I.Q.; 1.2% are mentally disabled.
Illinois: 29.3% rank in the "Dull Normal" I.Q. range or lower.
Iowa: Information not available.
Louisiana: Average 6 years schooling; average I.Q. is 80; 16% are
illiterate.
Michigan: 40% are below 90 I.Q.
Minnesota: 41% completed less than 9 years schooling; 29% are below
average I.Q.; 4% are mentally disabled; 1% are illiterate.
Mississippi: Information not available.
Missouri: Inmates claim an average of 9 years schooling, but achieve-
ment tests indicate 7 years.
Nebraska: Average 9 years schooling; average I.Q. is 96.
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New Hampshire: 20% completed less than 8 years schooling; average
I.Q. is between 85-95; 11 inmates (not percent) are illiterate.
New Jersey: 6-8 years average education; 7-8% illiteracy.
North Carolina: Inmates claim 8.33 years median education, achieve-
ment tests show 4.57 years; 49% have less than 90 I.Q.; 6.3% are mentally
defective.
North Dakota: Information not available.
Oregon: 6.2% completed less than 5 years schooling; 34% rank in the
"Dull Normal" I.Q. range or lower; 1% are mentally defective; 14% are
illiterate at admission, 2% at release. This is better than the national
average, due to prison schools. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
Pennsylvania: Information not available.
Rhode Island: Information not available.
South Carolina: 60% completed less than 9 years of school; 30% are
below 80 I.Q.
South Dakota: Inmates claim an average of 9.6 years schooling,
aclhievement tests indicate 8.7 years; average I.Q. is 96. All statistics are
from prison school enrollment only.
Tennessee: Information not available.
Texas: 5.1 years average educational achievement; average I.Q. is
86; 16% are illiterate upon admission.
Vermont: Information not available.
Virginia: 14% are "retarded" with respect to I.Q.; 15% are illiterate.
Washington: 9.8 years median schooling; I.Q. is average.
West Virginia: 54% completed less than 9 years schooling; 10% are
illiterate (estimate).
Wisconsin: 34.5% have completed less than 9 years schooling; but
59.4% rank less than 9 years schooling by test; 19.6% are in the "Dull
Normal" I.Q. range or lower.
Wyoming: 70% have completed less than 11 years schooling.
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